چكيده به لاتين
In recent years, sustainability issues have greatly captured the attention of the researchers, practitioners, governments and so on. In this research, a sustainable supply chain consists of one manufacturer and one retailer is studied under the cap-and-trade regulation. The manufacturer invests in the technology to reduce the carbon emissions. On the other hand, the retailer invests in green efforts while decides on its periodic review order-up-to level replenishment policy. Under such a case, both the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s decisions not only affect their individual profitability, but also impact on the whole SC performance and sustainability level. Therefore, a compensation-based wholesale price contract as an incentive mechanism is developed to coordinate the SC under the cap-an-trade regulation; thereby motivating both members to participate in the joint-decision making plan. The results show that the proposed coordination model simultaneously improves the sustainability level, the profits of both members and the whole SC.
In the second model, we study a manufacturer-duopolistic retailers chain under carbon emissions tax regulation. In the investigated environmentally friendly supply chain system, the manufacturer invests in the sustainable technology to reduce the carbon emissions and both retailers invest in the green efforts. To entice the retailers to increase their green efforts level, the manufacturer offers a vertical cooperative scheme to the retailers in which a fraction of the retailers’ green efforts costs are paid by the manufacturer. Moreover, the two duopolistic retailers compete on the green efforts in order to entice the end-consumers to purchase products from them. In the investigated chain, the manufacturer acts as the leader and duopolistic retailers act as the followers, where both retailers follow either Cournot or Collusion game structure. The decentralized models under Cournot and Collusion game strategies and the centralized model are formulated and compared to analyze the influence of different game behaviors on optimal decisions and sustainability performance. The results indicate that the centralized system will lower the carbon emissions and simultaneously increase the retailers’ green efforts and the entire supply chain profitability. Moreover, we propose an incentive method named compensation based contract to coordinate this system. In the proposed coordination model, a profit sharing plan based on Nash-bargaining solution is used to fairly share the extra benefit among the SC players. The results reveal that the proposed incentive contract not only coordinates the investigated SC but also enhances the green efforts level performance compared to the decentralized model.
In the thired model, we propose a coordination scheme in a dual channel environmentally responsible closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). we aim to coordinate energy saving, green manufacturing, green recycling, collecting, and pricing strategies under both competitive forward and reverse logistics. The competitive interactions among CLSC members (i.e., one remanufacturer, two retailers, and two collectors) are modeled and analyzed through decentralized, centralized, and coordinated decision-making structures. In the coordination model, the proposed energy saving cost sharing contract and two-part tariff contract working together are able to simultaneously motivate all CLSC members in both competitive forward and reverse logistics to participate in the coordination plan. The results indicate that the proposed coordination scheme improves the energy saving level and collection rates of used products in addition to the profits of all CLSC members and whole CLSC system and consequently it is of both economic and environmental benefits.
