چكيده به لاتين
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) effort and pricing policy are major factors affecting consumers’ purchasing behavior. In this study, a two-level supply chain consists of a manufacturer and two competing retailers is investegated by proposing the concept of social price-sensitivity of demand. In this model, the manufacturer aims to deacrease customers' sensitivities to the selling prices through corporating in social efforts. In addition, the retailers compete with each other on the selling prices offered to the consumers for the social responsible product. Therefore, the main contribution of this study is to propose a novel competitive price-dependent demand in which customers’ self-price and cross-price (competition degree) sensitivities depend on the manufacturer’s CSR effort. The social responsible supply chain is modelled in decentralized, centralized, and coordinated decision-making structures. Firstly, the optimal decisions of the supply chain members are evaluated in Stackelberg and Nash structures under retailers' Cournot and Collusion behaviors. Afterward, a two-part tariff contract is applied which is capable of coordinating decisions through different echelons of the supply chain in various game structures. Moreover, the contract can effectively decrease customers’ price sensitivity to the price of the social responsible product. The results suggest that the applied coordination model is capable of improving the performance of supply chain from both the economic and social aspects. In addition, using an appropriate profit sharing strategy, a win-win situation is provided for all social responsible supply chain members.
