چكيده به لاتين
Rafsanajan Plain, which is located in the Daranjir-Saghand Basin, incorporates more than 60000 hectares of pistachio orchards, most of which are irrigated with groundwater supply. In recent years, the over-extraction of groundwater resources (20 MCM more than the aquifer safe yield) brought about the annual drawdown of 80 cm. This problem leads the policy-makers to think about some demand-side management policies like groundwater markets. Therefore, this study attempts to analyze and assess the social, economic, and hydrologic impacts of the implementation of employing groundwater market in Rafsanjan Plain using Agent-Based modeling. This study examines three different market mechanisms comprised of discriminatory price double auction, uniform price double-auction, and equilibrium price double-auction. These market mechanisms are economically and hydrologically evaluated and compared, and the social impacts of market-based water allocation are analyzed in the discriminatory price double-auction mechanism. The results indicate that the emerged social norms as a result of market policy highly depend on the monitoring level and enforcement power. The appropriate monitoring and enforcement settings can lead to the emergence of a social norm that is enough to discourage violation, increase farmers' benefit, and reduce annual drawdown from 80 to 48 cm. Furthermore, the buyback program implemented in this study increased the farmers' net benefit, market competition, and brought about collective action.
