چكيده به لاتين
The involved parties in BOT projects (in direct negotiation process) are government, sponsor, and lender who have conflicting financial indices. Determining the value of financial decision variables (concession period length and capital structure) simultaneously has pivotal role for successful implementation of BOT project and prevents an unsuccessful negotiation or costly renegotiations.
In this research, first financial model of a BOT project is developed. The government's financial benefit of BOT project is considered as the summation of income tax and benefit from project operation since transferring the project to the government to the end of project economic life. Then a mathematical interpretation of conflicting financial interests of the parties is presented. In order to financial conflict resolution among involved parties, bargaining game theory has opted and three different bargaining game models are introduced to model the BOT negotiation process and determine the value of concession period length and capital structure simultaneously. In the first model, based on infinite-horizon bilateral bargaining game between the government and the sponsor considering lender’s requirement, in the second model, according to trilateral bargaining game model between three involved parties, and in the third model, based on finite-horizon bilateral bargaining considering the lender’s requirement, the value of concession period length and capital structure are predicted. The effect of risks and uncertainties are accounted in the three developed models.
The results of this research show that the value of the financial variables (concession period length and capital structure) are functions of negotiation process. Considering income tax which is paid by the sponsor as a part of governments’ financial benefit prolongs, average around 20%, the value of concession period length. In three proposed model, the effect of proposers’ order in negotiation process on the value of concession period length and equity level is analyzed. In the first and second prepared model, being the first proposer makes bigger share of financial benefit for proposer (sponsor or government) while in the third model, being the final proposer has advantage for proposer. In the first model, being the sponsor the first proposer prolongs the concession period length average around 12%. In the second model, being the sponsor the first proposer makes the concession period length average around 15.5% bigger than when the government is the first proposer.
