چكيده به لاتين
Since the late eighties, an increasing number of European regulatory authorities have been following the process of privatization of various activities in infrastructure and network industries such as telecommunications, transportation, and energy, including the electricity industry. Reform measures such as privatization, creation of regulators, and introduction of competition and decentralization in some production, transmission, distribution, and retail markets have been carried out. These recent activities, due to their natural exclusive conditions, need the intervention of a regulator (legislator) in order to ensure their correct performance and reward. Legislators have always done activities to increase the level of reliability of networks by using incentive schemes. But in the field of electric power systems, in addition to the reliability index, another index called resilience is proposed. Resilience is defined as the ability of a system to quickly recover from destructive events such as high-impact events and low probability of occurrence. Analysis of these incidents is very important for investors, legislators, and decision-makers in this industry to maintain and increase resilience, reliability, service quality, and customer service. There are different indicators, such as the amount of load cut off, the number of unsupplied subscribers, the number of damaged assets, etc., to measure the resilience of electricity distribution companies. Since the number of assets of electricity distribution companies is huge (with different lifetimes), one of the criteria for measuring the resilience of the network is the calculation of the number of assets that are damaged or at risk of damage. In this regard, the incentive model of reward and penalty based on resilience indicators is introduced. The reward and penalty scheme is a widespread tool that encourages distribution companies to improve service reliability. By applying this scheme, electricity distribution companies will be rewarded if they provide their services with an adequate level of reliability. On the other hand, it will be penalized if it provides a low level of reliability. The amounts of the bonus and its method can be determined according to the policies of the transferor. In the modeling process of this project, first, a method for calculating the number of assets at risk (taking into account the different life spans of assets) of electricity distribution companies is provided. Then a reward-penalty scheme based on resilience indicators has been implemented. Also, the methods of protecting assets against accidents and their costs have been modeled. In order to make investment decisions more straightforward, the objective function of all costs is calculated. Finally, in order to check the presented model, the degree of vulnerability of the company's assets exposed to a hypothetical accident is simulated and the results are checked.
