چكيده به لاتين
Due to the increasing environmental concerns and the increase in electronic waste, governments are trying to promote the purchase of environmentally friendly products and the return of used items for remanufacturing. However, a challenge governments face is when and how this supportive intervention should happen during the product life cycle (PLC). Supply chain members also face the challenge of determining when and in what pattern advertising and green initiatives should take place during the PLC to have the best impact on the demand and profits of the members. In this study, a supply chain consisting of the government, a manufacturer, and a retailer, which also collects used items in the second model, is considered in a Stackelberg game by presenting two mathematical models. The government is the leader of the manufacturer and the retailer, and the manufacturer is the leader of the retailer. In the first model, a green supply chain is analyzed and government intervention occurs by considering the characteristics of the PLC phases. The amount of each subsidy to provide to the manufacturer and the customer is determined by the government, the manufacturer dynamically determines the national advertising and green levels, while the retailer adjusts time-dependent pricing and local advertising level. The demand is dynamically affected by the retail price, local advertising level, and dynamic national advertising and green level due to the ups and downs in the PLC phases. Our analysis indicates that as customers become more green-sensitive, government costs increase due to higher subsidies, but environmental and social goals come closer to being achieved. To achieve efficiency, the government should balance subsidy costs with the benefits of promoting environmental objectives. The second model considers a closed-loop supply chain. In this supply chain, the government determines the demand-side subsidy and buy-back subsidy, the manufacturer sets the dynamic advertising level, and the retailer sets the retail price and collection effort. The demand is based on PLC and is influenced by the dynamic retail price and advertising level. The product return is also influenced by collection effort and buy-back price. By examining the government's utility function, we find that when the government increases the demand-side subsidy to increase demand, it simultaneously reduces the buy-back subsidy to reduce costs, or conversely, when it increases the buy-back subsidy to increase product return, it reduces the demand-side subsidy to reduce costs. Therefore, the government should carefully assess the appropriate amount of each subsidy by continuously monitoring the market to achieve its social and environmental goals at the lowest possible cost.
