چكيده به لاتين
Abstract:
Chip design and fabrication is becoming increasingly vulnerable to malicious activities and alternations with globalization of the semiconductor design and fabrication process, commonly known as hardware Trojans. This has raised serious concerns regarding possible threats to military systems, financial infrastructures, transportation security and even household appliances. Securing integrated circuits against malicious modifications (i.e., hardware Trojans) is of utmost importance, as hardware Trojans can make the IC design malfunction, leak confidential information and reduce reliability of electronic systems in critical applications.
Detecting hardware Trojan is a very large challenge and pique the interest of researchers around the world. Detecting hardware Trojan is a very large challenge and pique the interest of researchers around the world. The major Trojan detection techniques can be divided as: failure analysis based techniques, ATPG-based Trojan detection techniques and side channel signals analysis. Among these techniques, side channel signals analysis is a widely used technique.
Localized transient current anomalies for Trojan detection, while a signal calibration technique is used to eliminate the negative effect of process variation and noise. Two three benefits of
this method are that it can scale well to large circuits, that it golden chip free and determine Trojan’s location.
The proposed method is verified by Hspice simulation carried on ISCAS 85 benchmark
circuit. The 10000 times simulation results with 45nm CMOS process using Monte Carlo method show that the suggested methods are capable of detecting the Hardware Trojan whose
equivalent area is as small as 10-4 of the total size of the circuit in the presence of ±7% parameter(threshold voltage) variations
Keywords: Hardware Trojan, Hardware Security, Side Channel Attacks, Power Consumption.
