18820

۱۸۸۲۰

تحليل رقابت دو شركت با استفاده از نظريه بازي ها

كارشناسي ارشد

آناليز رياضي

اسفند ۱۳۹۶

دكتر محمد باقر قائمي

دكتر اسدالله آاجاني

رياضي

چكيده در اﯾﻦ ﺟﺎ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻮازن ﺳﯿﺎﺳﺖ ﻗﯿﻤﺖ ﮔﺬاري رادراﻧﺤﺼﺎر اﻗﺘﺼﺎدي دوﮔﺎﻧﻪ ﺗﺤﻠﯿﻞ ﻣﮐﻨﯿﻢ. اﯾﻦ ﺗﺤﻠﯿﻞﺑﺮاي زﻣﺎﻧﯿﺴﺖﮐﻪﯾك ﺷﺮﮐﺖدرﺣﺎﻟﯿﻪرﻗﯿﺒﺶ از روشﺗﺒﻌﯿﺾ ﻗﯿﻤﺖاﺳﺘﻔﺎده ﻣﮐﻨﺪ، ﯾﺎﺑﺎﯾﺪ ﺗﺒﻌﯿﺾ ﻗﯿﻤﺖﻣبتني ﺑﺮرﻓﺘﺎرراﺑﺮﮔﺰﯾﻨﺪﯾﺎﻗﯿﻤﺖﮔﺬاريﯾﺴﺎنرا. ﺳﻮاﻟﮐﻪﺑﺎآنﻣﻮاﺟﻪ هستيم اين هست :(۱) آﯾﺎﻫﻨﮕﺎﻣﮐﻪرﻗﯿﺐ ﯾك ﺷﺮﮐﺖازروشﺗﺒﻌﯿﺾﻗﯿﻤﺖاﺳﺘﻔﺎدهﻣﮐﻨﺪ شركت نيز بايد از روش تبعيض قيمت استفاده كند؟ ﻣﻬﻤﺘﺮﯾﻦﻧﺘﯿﺠﻪﮔﯿﺮيﻣﺎاﯾﻦﻫﺴﺖ،اﮔﺮﻣﺸﺘﺮﯾﺎنﺑﻪاﻧﺪارهﮐﺎﻓآﯾﻨﺪهﻧﮕﺮﻧﯿﺴﺘﻨﺪﺑﻬﺘﺮاﺳﺖﺑه ﺟﺎي اﺳﺘﻔﺎده ازروشﺗﺒﻌﯿﺾﻗﯿﻤﺖازروشﻗﯿﻤﺖﮔﺬاريﯾﺴﺎناﺳﺘﻔﺎدهﮐﻨﻨﺪ. اﯾﻦﻣﺴﺌﻠﻪ(۱)با رﺿﺎﯾﺖﻋﻤومي ﮐﻪازﻃﺮﯾﻖﻧﻈﺮﯾﻪ ﺗﺒﻌﯿﺾ ﻗﯿﻤﺖ ﮐﻼﺳﯿك در تضاد است ﻧﺸﺎﻧﮕﺮاﯾﻦاﺳﺖﮐﻪ ﻫﻨﮕﺎﻣﮐﻪ ﯾكﺷﺮﮐﺖﺑﺎﺷﺮﮐﺖاﻧﻌﻄﺎفﭘﺬﯾﺮيﻣﻮاﺟﻪ ميشود ﺑﻬﺘﺮاﺳﺖﺑﻪﺻﻮرتﯾﺠﺎﻧﺒﻪاز اﻧﻌﻄﺎفﭘﺬﯾﺮيﻗﯿﻤﺖﻫﺎﺳﺮﺑﺎزﻧﺪ.

1397/02/16

5/6/2018 12:00:00 AM

Abstract This thesis analyses the pricing policy equilibria emerging in a duopoly when one firm may choose whether to engage in behaviour-based price discrimination or uniform pricing while the rival price discriminates. The question we address is: should a firm price discriminate when facing a price discriminating rival? Our main conclusion is that, if the consumers are sufficiently myopic, it is better to choose uniform pricing instead of price discrimination. This is in contrast with the consensus reached in classic price discrimination theory, and it shows that it may be better for a firm to unilaterally renounce to price flexibility when facing a flexible firm.