چكيده به لاتين
In this thesis, a two-echelon supply chain (SC) consisting of one manufacturer as an upstream member and one retailer as a downstream member is considered where the end customer’s demand depends on retail price and retailer’s stock level. In this problem, the integration of pricing and ordering policies is simultaneously investigated. Firstly, we provide two mathematical models for decentralized and centralized decision-making models. Under decentralized model, the retailer offers a suitable price and provides adequatable stock level for customers to gain the desired market share. The retailer decides on the inventory replenishment, pricing, and ordering policies. The retailer’s decisions may affect the manufacturer profitability and the whole SC as well. Clearly, centralized model improves the whole SC profitability. If the centralized structure incur loss for retailer, the retailer will refuse to shift its decisions from decentralized model to centralized model. Hereon, by using credit period and wholesale price discount contracts as incentive approaches, we will coordinate the decisions of members in the decentralized mode. Both contracts are offered by the manufacturer to the retailer to persuade him/her to determine the order quantity and retail price aligned with the goals of the whole SC. This is the main contribution of this thesis, which along with a performance analysis and a comparison between two contracts are analytically carried out to determine which of the contracts should be chosen in different conditions. Also, the selected contracts consider the bargaining power of the SC members to take advantage from surplus profit in the centralized model by profit sharing strategy. Finally, using numerical examples and sensitivity analysis, we illustrate the efficiency of the proposed models in reducing the operational costs and increasing the profit and productivity. The numerical results showed that the credit period contract is higher profitable than the wholesale price discount contract when the retailer's interest rate is more than that of the manufacturer's.
