چكيده به لاتين
In recent years, the advent of several businesses in the field of production and service has expedited the technological advances more than ever; as a result of this, attention must be directed towards planning and precision in supply chain networks’ design. It is inevitable to bear in mind the utility of the several participants in this chain such as producers and retailers and this needs to be studied within the chain. By the turn of the era, many of the old industries which were exclusively working in the market were demonopolized and entered a competition over the price, quality, customer satisfaction, after-sale service, etc. with each opponent trying to gain more and more of the stock market share and utility. The competition was so tense that the neglect of any of the participants led to their demise and anonymity.
As time passed, the normal chains started to adjust themselves to the real world by using competitive supply chains. Such an act led to the application of game theories from which the famous ones are Stackelberg and Nash. Meanwhile, the opponents sometimes coalesce directly or indirectly to increase their share of the stock market and utility. Furthermore, often the use of improper strategies leads to the collapse of these production systems and their chains. Having said that, one realizes the importance of a competitive supply chain and by bearing in mind the factors such as the government intervention and uncertainty of the parameters, we could come up with a more realistic model and reduce the chance of failure amongst other opponents.
The present study attempts to discuss the design of supply chain networks in the leather industry by considering competition and uncertainty. It must be noted that concepts such as centralized and decentralized models, and government intervention or the absence of it, has also been considered. The presence or absence of the government has a great influence on the competition amongst producers. What is attempted in this study is to organize the end product to increase the benefit gained by the members of the supply chain and customer satisfaction in different modes. Sustainability is one of the concepts which have been discussed here and has been applied having considered all its three aspects i.e. environmental, economic, and social.
In this thesis, it is assumed that the two chains of leather in Iran -Tehran, and Tabriz- sell their products to the same retailer without open competition; therefore we will have two parallel Stackelberg competitions; Tehran and the retailer, Tabriz and the retailer. In this study, modeling is done in six different models. In the first step, we will design a decentralized supply chain without government intervention. In this step, the retailer will have a Stackelberg competition with each of the chains and they will discuss pricing and utility. In the second step, we will discuss the first model with the difference that a mutual contract is signed by the retailer and the chains to pay the franchise. Eventually, we will discuss the centralized model without government intervention; in this way, the retailer acts as the chains’ colleague and they will do the pricing together. In the next step, the three aforementioned methods will be considered with government presence. In this study, all the proposed models are considered with certainty and then again the same models are discussed with uncertainty in parameters such as chain production costs and the market’s potential for the green product. To confront the uncertainty, we are used by fuzzy programming.
To discuss the utility and the function of the model, the proposed models have been applied to Iran’s leather industry. The results have been extracted using Matlab and Mathematica. In the end, we will analyze the important parameters and we will compare various modes such as tax and subsidy on chains. This signifies considering different governmental policies and one policy will not be considered alone and attempts have been made to do justice not in the sense that the chains are considered equal, rather the factors to which the model is sensitive are discussed; factors such as the degree of the products’ greenness and tax level. Furthermore, considering uncertainty in the cost of production chains and market potentials makes our model more tangible.
